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I. Introduction
OCKET propellants have been used in the United States since shortly after World War II when the German technology was recovered and reverse engineered. Since that time many different propellants have been in use and many have achieved common usage. This paper examines those propellants that have seen common usage and perform a literature search for historical records related to accidents, mishaps and fatalities. These historical records are then mined to determine failures on a per unit mass consumed basis. As such the paper is not intended to be a reliability paper but to provide some sort of metric that may be used for discussion concerning one's preferred propellant. The paper focuses on liquid propellants/propellant combinations in particular using data from the launch vehicles of SCOUT, Atlas, Delta, Space Shuttle and Titan. Additionally, accident/failure data from the Apollo time period 1963-1971 and from the Soviet Soyuz vehicle will be reviewed. Hence the paper contains the three data sets mentioned: US launch vehicles, Apollo, Soyuz
II. US Launch Vehicles (1958-1999)
Because of the limited availability of historical accident data in the aerospace community the following ground rules and assumptions were used as the basis for the launch vehicle data: Failure is defined as any event (catastrophic or otherwise) which causes the system to fail to meet the intended mission. 8. Blindly accept that a failure of a propulsion unit is the fault of the specific propellant or propellant combination being used. This is primarily necessary because the specific details of failure are not available to the author and is often the case the "cause" is the subject of debate. In cases where the failure is non-propulsive the failure will not be counted. 9. Seeking information on propellants, as such in the majority of cases will group fluids together as used.
Example being stage 1 of Soyuz is LOX/Kerosene so propulsive failure of stage 1 will assign failure to propellant combination of LOX/Kerosene. 10. Open source literature only, most recent dates limited to 1999 due to limitations on available references.
Given the above restrictions this limits the launch vehicle study to the following vehicles: SCOUT, Atlas, Delta, Space Shuttle & Titan. Strictly speaking the SCOUT vehicle does not fit our definitions but does utilize hydrogen peroxide for stabilization during stages 2 & 3 and will provide comparison data for the hydrogen peroxide utilized on the Soyuz vehicle. Table 1 shows the respective propellants/combinations associated with each vehicle and as can be seen the propellant list is limited to the following eight (8) propellants/combinations: Solids (making no distinction for binder, etc), hydrogen peroxide (H2O2), LOX/RP (assumed synonymous with LOX/kerosene variations), Nitric Acid/Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (HNO3/UDMH), Nitrogen Tetraoxide/Aerozine 50 (NTO/A50), Nitrogen (Helium also exists on some of the vehicles in small mass quantity with no specific failures assigned so is not listed), Liquid Oxygen/Liquid Hydrogen (LOX/LH2), Nitrogen Tetraoxide/MonoMethyl Hydrazine (NTO/MMH). The combination of NTO/A50 is similar to NTO/MMH in that both fuels are in the hydrazine family however the data was kept separate to look to see if a difference exists. For comparison the data for Apollo and Soyuz are also shown and will be discussed in subsequent sections. Additionally for rough comparison is shown the number of flights in the population that is to be examined. Flights in Population  113  299  271  94  203  1573 References 5 & 6 show the reliability of these launch vehicles increases with increased launch attempts as one would expect with learning. No attempts were made to compensate for this fact and the entire vehicle's history was included in the analysis. The most recent data available to the author was 1999, hence the periods studied were as follows: SCOUT 1960 -1990 , Atlas 1958 -1999 , Delta 1960 -1999 , Shuttle 1981 -1998 , Titan 1964 -1999 . The data failure records for each vehicle were then examined and propulsive related failures were then assigned to a specific propellant or propellant combination. The entire family history was then segregated into its respective configurations and then each configuration was examined for nominal propellant consumed specific to each propellant or American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics combination. The results provided total propellant consumed over the study period for each propellant/combination. Hence from this information the number of failures per million pounds of propellant consumed per specific propellant is then calculated. References 1-4 were extensively used for this examination and in some cases discrepancies existed between each and some data was lacking (i.e. H2O2 loading for SCOUT). In such cases the best guess judgment was used to resolve the discrepancy. Additionally, most vehicle use some pressurant gases, the contribution from this fluid were ignored in the cases where they were not specifically assigned a failure. In particular Delta uses gaseous Nitrogen for attitude and roll control of stage 2 which was the cause of a few failures. It is also worth noting and astounding that the only fatalities within this population of vehicles related to propulsion (or a propellant) is the Challenger incident of 51L.
Results of the aforementioned analysis are shown in Table 2 & 3. Table 2 shows that there is a very large variation in failures associated with particular propellant/combinations with some propellants appearing to have no failures (H2O2 & NTO/MMH). Examination of the total propellant mass consumed shows that if the examination is narrowed to those propellants where more than 10 million pounds consumed there exists roughly similar result. The propellants, by launch vehicle, which have consumed more than 10 million pounds are highlighted in Table 2 . As can be seen all of these propellants have been the cause of failures on at least one launch vehicle (see Figure 1 for some pictures of spectacular failures) and very successful the absence of failures in some special cases (Shuttle -LOX/LH2, Delta -LOX/RP). Within the greater than 10 million pounds of propellant population it appears that the failures per mass are somewhat similar. This would lead to the suggestion that the failures are all approximately the same if sufficient propellant is consumed. Hence in Table 3 is presented the failures per million pounds of propellant over the entire US launch vehicle population in the study (980 launches). Those propellants in the greater than 10 million pounds of propellant are highlighted in Table 3 . This reduces the population to just four propellants: Solids, LOX/RP, NTO/A50, LOX/LH2. Each of these propellants has a very similar failure per mass number ranging from 0.045 to 0.082 (failures per million pounds of propellant). With Solids being roughly half of NTO/A50 with 4 to 5 times the propellant consumed. 
III. Soyuz Comparison (1957-1999)
Given the results of the prior section the author performed the same type of analysis on the Soviet Vostok/Soyuz/Molniya Vehicle (subsequently referred to as Soyuz for shorthand). As such the data will provide a mild comparison between US and Soviet experiences. For simplicity the entire population was approximated as a Soyuz U vehicle, a few of the more recent flights have used an upper stage with NTO/UDMH but this was ignored American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics since there would be insufficient propellant consumed to get over the 10 million pound mark. Complicating the issue is the fatal failure which occurred during prelaunch on March 18, 1980. The official report placed blame on a LOX leak caused by ground crew error. However, later it was recognized that the H2O2 tankage system may have erroneously use incompatible materials which may have been at fault. Review of several sources (references 3, 4, 7-9) reveals a variety of stories and biases toward one story or the other. As such the results shown in Table 4 are calculated with the failure grouped with LOX/Kerosene and the other grouped with H2O2.
As can be seen in Table 4 H2O2 now has more than 10 million pounds consumed and irrespective of including the March 18, 1980 incident the number of failures per mass is within the US population noted for other propellants. Additionally, the value of failures per mass obtained for LOX/Kerosene is also within the US population and only about 25% less with approximately 9 times the total mass of propellant consumed. 
IV. Apollo Program Accident Reports (1963-1971)
Flight and ground operation accident information for most of the Apollo program was found to be available from two review studies that NASA had contracted. The first covers the years [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] 10 and the second 1970-1971 11 . Different from the prior sections insufficient data was available to compare all of the failures or accidents on a per mass basis. However, these reports do provide some insight to ground operations. From Table 1 in a prior section we see that the major propellants of the Apollo program were: LOX/RP, NTO/UDMH & LOX/LH2. A quick review of the document from the 1963-1969 period shows the phase "… exploded …" associated with each of the mentioned propellants (less RP). Table 5 shows just a few samples of these accidents with at least one being fatal. Hence it may be concluded that each of these propellants are capable of causing a launch failure as noted in the prior sections.
V. Conclusion
The public domain US liquid propellant launch vehicle information up to 1999 has been reviewed and contrasted to the Soviet historical experience with the Soyuz launch vehicle. The historically adopted propellants in the launch vehicle systems are comprised of eight propellants: Solids, H2O2, LOX/RP, HNO3/UDMH, NTO/A50, Nitrogen, LOX/LH2 & NTO/MMH. In addition the Apollo accident reports were reviewed for information. Consequently the following conclusions are draw:
• All historically adopted propellants/combinations have caused US launch vehicle failures.
• The phrase: "… exploded …" applies to all historically adopted propellants/combinations.
• Not all propellants/combinations have directly caused a fatality which only seems to be fortuitous because not all failures or "… exploded …" events had humans in close proximity.
• Failures per million pounds of propellant seems to range between 0.04 -0.08 (failures/Mlbm) when more than 10 Mlbm have been used. This applies to: H2O2, LOX/Kerosene, Solids, LOX/LH2 & NTO/A50.
• All propellants can and will get you -they must be respected for their high power density. 
